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When the Lights Went Out: Electricity in North Korea 
and Dependency on Moscow
Benjamin R. Young*
The division of the Korean Peninsula has been symbolized by 
electricity. While South Korea lights up on satellite images, North Korea 
is dark. Using archival documents from North Korea’s former communist 
allies and Pyongyang’s state-run media, the author argues that the 
DPRK’s electricity shortages were not a result of the regime’s Juche 
ideology but rather an outcome of overreliance on Soviet assistance. 
This analysis disputes the notion of North Korea’s Juche ideology as 
a totalizing phenomenon within the DPRK’s political structure. By 
presenting a multifaceted history of North Korea’s electricity sector, the 
author highlights the ways in which Pyongyang engaged with Soviet 
electrification aid and global energy trends generally.  
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On December 22, 1920, Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin announced in a 
report on the work of the Council of People’s Commissars, “Communism 
is Soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country. Otherwise the 
country will remain a small-peasant country, and we must clearly realize 
that.”1 As the founder of the first self-proclaimed workers’ state, Lenin’s 
emphasis on electricity as the basis of communism would have 
reverberations throughout the Eastern Bloc for decades to come. After the 
division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945 between the Soviet-controlled 
North and the U.S.-controlled South, electricity would become a symbol 
of North Korean power. Founded in 1948, the government of the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the official title of North Korea, 
hereafter DPRK) featured a coat of arms, which positioned a hydroelectric 
power plant in the middle. Lenin’s expression of electricity as 
communism was alive and well in the nascent DPRK. 
However, as most outside observers are aware, North Korea is a 
country that currently lacks sufficient electricity. The famous satellite 
image of a dark North Korea contrasted with a well-lit South Korea 
(officially known as the Republic of Korea, hereafter ROK) makes the 
division all the more tangible. In 2002, U.S. Secretary of State Donald 
Rumsfeld said, “If you look at a picture from the sky of the Korean 
Peninsula at night, South Korea is filled with lights and energy and 
vitality and a booming economy; North Korea is dark.” Rumsfeld 
concludes, “It is a tragedy what is being done in that country.”2 The 
regular blackouts in the DPRK, especially in the rural provinces, have 
seemingly become the ultimate symbol of North Korea’s backwardness 
and its dysfunctional economy. While scholars of North Korea often 
emphasize the regime’s Juche ideology as the reason for the country’s 
1 Vladimir Lenin, Report on the Work of the Council of People’s Commissars, 
December 22, 1920. Original Source: Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 5th ed. 
(Moscow, 1975-79), vol. 36, pp. 15-16, <http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1921-2/
electrification-campaign/communism-is-soviet-power-electrification-of-the-
whole-country/> (date accessed December 17, 2019).
2 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Defense Department Briefing Transcript, December 23, 
2002, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2002/12/mil-
021223-usia01.htm> (date accessed December 17, 2019). 
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electricity shortages, little systematic research has actually been done on 
the history of North Korea’s electricity. One of the primary reasons for 
this lack of research is due to the fact that the DPRK government does 
not publish reliable economic data. Despite regular blackouts 
throughout the country, North Korean state-run media regularly boasts 
about the well-lit streets of Pyongyang and the robust industrial 
production of the DPRK’s factories. In North Korea’s state-controlled 
media landscape, it is hard to discern reality from propaganda. 
However, with the help of archival documents from North Korea’s 
former communist allies and a critical analysis of the Kim family 
regime’s state-run media, I piece together a qualitative history of North 
Korea’s electricity. In so doing, I argue that North Korea’s electricity 
shortages were not a consequence of the regime’s Juche ideology but 
rather a result of the DPRK’s overreliance on Soviet aid.
Analysts of North Korea often cite Juche ideology as a reason for the 
country’s economic troubles and electricity blackouts. For example, Chae-
Jin Lee said, “Aside from the structural deficiencies of its centrally planned 
economic system, North Korea suffered from the constraints of the Juche 
(self-reliance) ideology and the heavy burden of defense expenditures.”3 
Ian Rinehart explains, “Juche-inspired policies severely limited North 
Korea’s economic growth by allocating scarce resources to unproductive 
industries for the sake of self-reliance.”4 Valentin I. Moiseyev wrote that 
“considering North Korea’s Juche tenets and, fearing a raw material 
dependence on the Soviet Union (adding to the existing technological 
dependence), Kim Il Sung insisted on using domestic coal as fuel for the 
thermal power plants.”5 While the costs of North Korea’s excessive 
militarization surely deepened the country’s economic issues, 
3 Chae-Jin Lee, A Troubled Peace: U.S. Policy and the Two Koreas (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2006), pp. 283-284. 
4 Ian Rinehart, “Nothing to be Afraid Of? North Korean Political Economy and 
Economic Reform,” Korea Economic Institute, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies 
Emerging Voices Working Paper, vol. 22 (2011), p. 8. 
5 Valentin I. Moiseyev, “The North Korean Energy Sector,” in The North Korean 
Nuclear Program Security, Strategy and New Perspectives from Russia, ed. James 
Moltz Clay and Alexandre Y. Mansourov (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 53.
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Pyongyang’s adherence to Juche ideology as an economic model and 
electrification strategy seems to be based on mere assumption. 
In order to dig deeper into this assumption, it is important to 
discuss Juche ideology. In 1955, Kim Il Sung first promoted the idea of 
Juche within the DPRK. He said, “What is Juche in our Party's 
ideological work? What are we doing? We are not engaged in any other 
country's revolution, but precisely in the Korean revolution…. Therefore, 
all ideological work must be subordinated to the interests of the Korean 
revolution.”6 This ideology, which champions self-reliance and self-
sufficiency, has continued to inform official DPRK rhetoric since 1955. 
However, as this article explains, North Korea’s dependence on Soviet 
aid for electricity stands in stark contrast to the nationalistic character of 
the Juche ideology. So what does Juche mean? Bruce Cumings explains, 
“The term is really untranslatable; the closer one gets to its meaning, the 
more the meaning slips away.”7 Bradley K. Martin explains that the 
broader meaning of Juche is “putting Korea first.”8 Alzo David-West 
contends that “Juche is not a philosophy, but an ideology of political 
justification for the dictatorship of Kim Il Sung.”9 Perhaps the one 
characteristic of Juche that all of these scholars can agree upon is that the 
ideology was designed to signify North Korean autonomy, whether real 
or perceived. “Self-reliance” is the general definition fixed upon Juche by 
North Korea scholars and many of these analysts grasp for a deeper 
meaning beyond this simple phrase. However, what has been missed in 
most analyses of Juche is the extent to which it represents the DPRK’s 
utopian motivations. 
6 Kim Il Sung, “On eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing Juche 
in ideological work,” Kim Il Sung: Selected Works 1 (1955), p. 582-606, <https://
www.marxists.org/archive/kim-il-sung/1955/12/28.htm> (date accessed May 
17, 2020). 
7 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1997), p. 404. 
8 Bradley K. Martin, Under the Loving Care of the Fatherly Leader (New York: Thomas 
Dunne Books, 2004), p. 363.
9 Alzo David-West, “Between Confucianism and Marxism-Leninism: Juche and the 
Case of Chong Tasan,” Korean Studies, vol. 35 (2011), p. 107.
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The North Korean leadership hoped to build a staunchly 
independent economy based on Juche’s utopian principles of self-
reliance, self-strengthening, and self-sufficiency. As with most Marxist 
states, utopianism was a central component of the state’s future-oriented 
political culture. Lenin wrote in What Is To Be Done? that communists 
“should dream.”10 Utopian thought was a way to construct a shared 
value system, revolutionary society, and new collective consciousness. 
Robert Winstanley-Chesters writes, “Juche has been the vessel through 
which utopian possibility has filtered into the more conventional forms 
of developmental and institutional approach and governmental function 
in North Korea as well as in its narratives of presentation, support, and 
legitimacy.”11 Despite this Juche rhetoric, North Korea was heavily 
dependent on the Communist Bloc for aid throughout the Cold War era. 
According to the U.S. Library of Congress’s official book North Korea: A 
Country Study, “Estimates vary, but it is likely that the equivalent of U.S. 
$4.75 billion of aid was accepted [by North Korea] between 1946 and 
1984. Almost 46 percent of the assistance came from the Soviet Union, 
followed by China with about 18 percent, and the rest from East 
European communist countries.”12 Liudmila Zakharova explains, “By 
the early 1990s, the facilities built in the DPRK with Soviet help 
produced up to 70% of electricity, 50% of chemical fertilisers, and about 
40% of ferrous metals. The aluminum industry was created entirely by 
Soviet specialists. Approximately, 70 large industrial enterprises in 
North Korea were built with the assistance of the USSR.”13 Therefore, 
Juche was not an economic blueprint for North Korea but a form of 
10 Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, “What Is To Be Done?,” Lenin’s Selected Works, vol. 1, first 
published as a separate work in March 1902, <https://www.marxists.org/
archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/v.htm> (date accessed May 17, 2020). 
11 Robert Winstanley-Chesters, Environment, Politics, and Ideology in North Korea: 
Landscape as Political Project (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014), p. 5.
12 Andrea Matles Savada, ed., North Korea: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for 
the Library of Congress, 1993), <http://countrystudies.us/north-korea/54.htm> 
(date accessed May 17, 2020).
13 Liudmila Zakharova, “Economic Cooperation between Russia and North Korea: 
New Goals and New Approaches,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, vol. 7, no. 2 (July 
2016), p. 152.
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utopianism that the Kim family regime sought to achieve one day. North 
Korea’s electricity shortages were not a result of the leadership’s strict 
adherence to Juche ideology as they never strictly followed a policy of 
economic self-sufficiency. 
While the DPRK and the Soviet Union sometimes disagreed with 
each other’s policies, Pyongyang depended on Moscow for technical 
assistance and financial aid.14 In the same 1955 speech where Kim Il 
Sung first promoted Juche, he also praised Soviet internationalism. He 
said, “For the victory of the Korean revolution and for the great cause of 
the international working class, we should strengthen solidarity with the 
Soviet people, our liberator and helper, and with the peoples of all the 
socialist countries.”15 Without Moscow’s help, the DPRK most likely 
would not have survived as a nation-state during the Cold War era. 
Despite officially promoting self-reliance in public discourse, the North 
Korean leadership depended heavily on Soviet technical expertise for 
electric power. Whether it was the construction of the Supung Power 
Plant or the delivery of fuel, the Soviet Union invested heavily in the 
DPRK’s electrification. By relying so heavily on Soviet assistance, the 
North Korean leadership was unprepared for the Soviet Union’s sudden 
dissolution in the 1990s. 
While the North Korean government imposes a strict information 
blockade on international news and events, electricity is one of the few 
areas where the average North Korean can tangibly see the opaque party-
state’s difficulties. As journalist Barbara Demick explains, “North 
Koreans complain bitterly about the darkness, which they still blame on 
the U.S. sanctions. They can’t read at night. They can’t watch television. 
‘We have no culture without electricity,’ a burly North Korean security 
guard once told me accusingly.”16 In addition with satellite imagery, the 
14 Harry Gelman and Norman D. Levin, “The Future of Soviet-North Korean 
Relations,” Rand Corporation - A Project Air Force Report Prepared for the 
United States Air Force (October 1984), pp. 1-52. 
15 Kim Il Sung, “On eliminating dogmatism and formalism and establishing Juche 
in ideological work.”
16 Barbara Demick, Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea (New York: 
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outside world now sees the glaring inefficiencies of the DPRK’s power 
grid. However, outside of Demick’s journalistic account of North Korea 
in the mid-1990s, few scholars have qualitatively examined the history of 
the DPRK’s electricity sector and the ways in which the leadership in 
Pyongyang addressed electricity scarcity in the country. The notable 
exception here is Alex S. Forster’s 2014 paper, entitled “Electrifying North 
Korea,” which focuses more on contemporary energy issues in the DPRK 
and how to address them.17 Scholars have not systematically investigated 
the transition of postcolonial North Korea with its mighty hydroelectric 
power plants to a candle-lit nation that now deals with regular blackouts. 
Using qualitative data analysis from Communist Bloc archives and 
declassified U.S. government documents, I argue that in order to better 
understand the DPRK’s electricity shortages, we must look at the history 
of the Soviet Union’s electrification aid to North Korea. 
From Postcolonialism to Postwar: North Korea, 1945-1959
While the Japanese colonialists exploited the natural resources and 
labor of the Korean people, they did leave one benefit behind in their 
destructive wake: large-scale hydroelectric power plants. According to 
Andrei Lankov, the northern part of Korea produced 85% of all of the 
peninsula’s electricity in 1940.18 These large-scale facilities, which were 
primarily concentrated in northern Korea due to its mountainous terrain, 
became massively useful for Kim Il Sung’s nascent regime. In fact, 
immediately after the collapse of the Japanese Empire in 1945, North 
Korea started selling electric power to their southern brethren. In January 
1947, the Colonel-General of Soviet forces in North Korea, Terenty Fomich 
Shtykov, sent a letter to the U.S. General-Lieutenant in South Korea, John 
Random House, 2010), p. 4.
17 Alex S. Forster, “Electrifying North Korea: Bringing Power to Underserved 
Marginal Populations in the DPRK,” East-West Center Working Papers, no. 69 (April 
2014), pp. 1-24.
18 Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 72.
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R. Hodge, in which he alerted the Americans that South Korea had not 
paid for any electricity that was provided by the north. According to the 
letter, the bill in U.S. dollars was $4,240,261. Shtykov explained, “This 
arrangement has led to the economic downfall of North Korean power 
stations. Due to the balance deficit, major repairs and equipment 
maintenance are not taking place, and there are great delays in the salary 
of the maintenance personnel.”19 This image of an energy-deficient South 
Korea and a high-powered North Korea in the post-liberation period 
stands in stark contrast to the present-day electricity situations of the two 
Koreas. With substantial rainfall, North Korea’s hydroelectric stations 
were producing large amounts of power in the post-liberation era.
American journalist Anna Louse Strong visited the DPRK in 1948 
and remarked, “The great power stations on the Yalu River were built by 
the Japanese. The Russians seized them as war booty and promptly gave 
them ‘to the Korean people’ in the summer of 1946.”  In fact, Soviet 
engineers hoped to replicate the design of the Yalu River hydroelectric 
power plant’s generators for their own country’s energy sector. 
According to a declassified U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
document, Soviet specialists dismantled two generators and two 
transformers in December 1945 from the DPRK’s Supung power plant 
and transported them to the Soviet Union.20 On March 5, 1949, Kim Il 
Sung told Stalin “that after the liberation of Korea by Soviet troops, the 
Soviet Government and the Soviet Army rendered aid to Korea in the 
matter of economic development.” Kim continued, “The assistance of 
the Soviet Union is required for the further development of the Korean 
economy and culture.”21 Strong explained that the U.S. forces in South 
19 "Letter to General-Lieutenant Hodge on Northern Korea Providing Electricity 
to Southern Korea," January 01, 1947, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, TsAMO, Fond not listed, Opis 480c, Delo 25, listi 22-23. Obtained 
by Kim Dong-gil and translated by Aleksandr Gorokhov and James Person, 
<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114896> (date accessed 
May 17, 2020).
20 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Report on the Electrical Industry in North 
Korea,” Information Report, January 1957, p. 16.
21 “Notes of the Conversation between Comrade I.V. Stalin and a Governmental 
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Korea were not paying their electric bills to Pyongyang as the North 
Korean government demanded payment in electric equipment, not U.S. 
dollars or goods. Strong added, “The Americans offered nylon stockings 
and tobacco and Hollywood movies. But the North Koreans stood pat 
on getting electric equipment.” Strong continued, “The reason was plain: 
so much electric development was going on in all the farming villages of 
North Korea that they simply could not spare power for South Korea 
unless they got more equipment. It was as simple as that.”22 In May 
1948, the North Koreans shut off the power to South Korea altogether. 
The situation for North Korea’s energy infrastructure predictably 
deteriorated during the Korean War. According to Cheehyung Harrison 
Kim, “In June 1950, 90 percent of North Korea’s electric power potential 
was wiped out.”23 Due to U.S. aerial bombardment, a majority of the 
hydroelectric power plants were out of commission from 1950 to 1953. In 
an August 1952 report, the Polish embassy in the DPRK commented, 
“The bombing of four large hydro-electric power stations on Yalu on 
20-23 June of this year deprived all of North Korea and a part of North-
Eastern China of electric energy, that is, industry stopped almost 
completely, some rice fields that were artificially irrigated and cities 
remained without water.” The report continued, “Electrification is 
universal in Korea, and therefore a shortage of electric energy is felt so 
strongly.” The Korean War devastated North Korea’s electric output, and 
this wreaked havoc on the entire country’s economy. 
Less than a year later, the Polish embassy explained, “The bombarding 
of the electric power plant in Supung in July 1952, and the subsequent 
Delegation from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea headed by Kim Il 
Sung,” March 05, 1949, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP 
RF, fond 059a, opis 5a, delo 3, papka 11, listy 10-20, and RGASPI, f. 558, op. 11, d. 
346, ll. 0013-0023, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112127> 
(date accessed May 17, 2020). 
22 Anna Louise Strong, “In North Korea: First Eye-Witness Report,” <https://
www.marxists.org/reference/archive/strong-anna-louise/1949/in-north-
korea/ch07.htm> (date accessed May 17, 2020). 
23 Cheehyung Harrison Kim, Heroes and Toilers: Work as Life in Postwar North Korea 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), p. 76.
116 Benjamin R. Young
destruction of other electric power plants, has largely made the execution of 
plans for industry and agriculture difficult, since the basic sources of energy 
were destroyed or damaged.” The report added, “Not only industry but 
also rice paddies, which are artificially watered by electric pumps, have 
been endangered.”24 As the Polish diplomatic reports explain, electricity 
from hydroelectric power plants also fueled agricultural pumps on North 
Korean farms. This overreliance on hydroelectricity would later have 
devastating effects for the North Korean people during periods of drought.  
After the war, the Korean Workers’ Party immediately established a 
five-year plan for rebuilding the country’s economy. Due to assistance 
from the Communist Bloc, especially the Soviet Union, North Korea’s 
postwar development was rapid. The postwar reconstruction plan 
stressed “the production of electric turbines, which are indispensable to 
equipping the rebuilt power plants.”25 With Soviet assistance, the North 
Koreans emphasized the rebuilding of the Supung power plant. The 
Japanese colonialists originally built the Supung power plant in 1943, 
which was the largest hydroelectric facility of its kind in Asia at the 
time.26 On one hand, North Korea depended on Soviet aid in the 
postwar period but on the other hand, Kim Il Sung started to promote 
an independent line. Kim Il Sung’s 1955 Juche speech to North Korean 
propagandists was the first clear expression of Korean nationalism. In 
1959, Juche started to appear widely in internal Korean Workers’ Party 
reports and lectures. Pak Deok-hwan, a Soviet-Korean and counselor in 
24 "Note from the Embassy of the Polish Republic in Korea," January 27, 1953, 
History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Polish Foreign Ministry 
Archive. Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and translated for NKIDP by 
Maya Latynski, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114945> 
(date accessed May 17, 2020).
25 “Report no. 5 of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of Poland in the 
Democratic Republic of Korea for the Period of 1 August 1953 to 30 September 
1953,” September 30, 1953, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
Polish Foreign Ministry Archive. Obtained for NKIDP by Jakub Poprocki and 
translated for NKIDP by Maya Latynski, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.
org/document/114958> (date accessed May 17, 2020). 
26 Hy-Sang Lee, North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress (Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger Publishers, 2000), p. 102.
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the DPRK’s Foreign Ministry, explained that the substance of Juche “was 
that everything Korean is better compared to [anything] foreign.”27
Despite Kim’s promotion of Juche in 1955, the Supung power plant on 
the Yalu River, also known as the Amnok River, became a symbol of Soviet-
DPRK comradeship during the mid to late 1950s. The KWP’s Central 
Committee explained in their August 1953 plenum, “Thanks to the 
enormous technical and material assistance from the Soviet Union, the 
DPRK government has begun to rebuild the largest power plant on the 
river Amnok in Supung, which was damaged during the war.” The 
committee announced, “This year still, the Supung power plant is to 
produce three times more electrical energy than it does currently. Right 
now, thanks to the evacuation in the war of its valuable equipment, the 
workers are completing the assembly and restoration of one of the largest 
generators in that power plant.” As this Polish report mentions, much of 
the “valuable” equipment from the Supung power plant was evacuated 
during the Korean War. As Cheehyung Harrison Kim explains, “The 
wartime production regime involved the relocation of production sites 
(sogae) – the tremendous project of dismantling vital factories, evacuating 
them to safe locations, often underground or in caves, and reassembling 
them to resume production.”28 The North Koreans used their mountainous 
landscape to their advantage during wartime and hid their most valuable 
industrial equipment from U.S. air bombing in this rugged terrain. 
It was in the immediate postwar period when the Kim family 
regime decided to focus its energy resources on the capital city, 
Pyongyang. As the showcase capital and home of the most loyal KWP 
members, the residents of Pyongyang have historically enjoyed longer 
bouts of electricity than their countrymen in the provinces. According to 
Kim Il Sung himself, 36% of the North Korean countryside had no access 
27 “From the Journal of N. Ye. Torbenkov, Record of a Conversation with 
DPRK MFA Counselor Pak Deok-hwan,” June 01, 1960, History and Public 
Policy Program Digital Archive, Translated for CWIHP by Gary Goldberg. 
AVPRF fond 0102, opis 16, delo 6, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/121622> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
28 Kim, Heroes and Toilers, p.30.
118 Benjamin R. Young
to electricity in 1958.29 As explained in his first five-year plan, Kim Il 
Sung intended to build a thermal power station in Pyongyang in order 
to give those residents central heating. In 1957, the Soviet ambassador to 
the DPRK, A.M Puzanov, remarked in his journal, “An important task of 
the heat and power station will be to supply the housing facilities of the 
capital with heat for central heating. This heat and power station will 
also yield electrical power and improve the republic's energy mix during 
low loads due to a shortage of water for hydroelectric power plants.”30 
While Pyongyang residents enjoyed central heating during the winter 
months, those in rural areas dealt with inconsistent electricity or 
complete blackouts. 
The North Korea electrical grid was heavily dependent on rainfall 
in the Yalu River area. Thus, Kim Il Sung intended to diversify the 
electrical grid of the DPRK away from large-scale hydroelectric power 
plants on the Yalu River. In 1958, Kim told China’s Premier Zhou Enlai 
about severe droughts in North Korea and the problems this caused for 
the country’s electric output. Kim explained, “This year has had the least 
amount of rain water [on record]. The elderly say that this is the worst it 
has been in 100 years… At present, we have started an electricity 
conservation campaign [because] in the past [electricity] was wasted.”31 
Kim suggested the construction of small-scale hydroelectric plants, 
rather than the large-scale facilities originally built by the Japanese, for 
29 "Record of Conversation from the Premier's Reception of the Korean Government 
Delegation," November 22, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, PRC FMA 204-00064-02, 9-25. Translated by Jeffrey Wang and Charles 
Kraus, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114176> (date 
accessed May 17, 2020). 
30 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 8 June 1957," 
June 08, 1957, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF F. 
0102, Op. 13, P. 72, Delo 5, Listy 114-130. Translated by Gary Goldberg, <https://
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115624> (date accessed May 17, 2020). 
31 "Record of Conversation from the Premier's Reception of the Korean Government 
Delegation," November 22, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, PRC FMA 204-00064-02, 9-25. Translated by Jeffrey Wang and Charles 
Kraus, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114176> (date 
accessed May 17, 2020). 
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rural areas. Kim explained, “We have already established some small-
scale hydroelectric power stations in rural areas, and we estimate that by 
next year all rural areas will have electricity.”32 While Kim’s energy plan 
for all of rural North Korea obviously did not come to fruition, his focus 
on electricity in his nation-building program was in line with Lenin’s 
original motif that “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification 
of the whole country.”
One of the major reasons for North Korea’s poor electric output was 
its overreliance on these outdated large-scale hydroelectric power plants. 
In May 1964, Kim Il Sung vented his frustrations to his Chinese 
counterparts, “The Japanese constructed Supung Dam is of poor quality 
and requires repairs every year. It is really bad. It took the Japanese nine 
years to build the Supung Dam.”33 Electricity and industry were 
intimately linked in the DPRK due to the country’s reliance on 
hydropower. As Hy-Sang Lee explains, “Though very low in operating 
costs, hydropower plants required the highest investment cost per unit 
of generating capacity created.”34 In June 1960, the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry’s Far East Department commented, “As the past year showed, 
electric power is the bottleneck in industry. In 1959 the electric power 
industry produced 7.8 billion kilowatt-hours against the 9.7 billion 
kilowatt-hours planned for the next year of the five-year plan.”35
32 "Record of Conversation from the Premier's Reception of the Korean Government 
Delegation," November 22, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, PRC FMA 204-00064-02, 9-25. Translated by Jeffrey Wang and Charles 
Kraus, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114176> (date 
accessed May 17, 2020).
33 “Cable from the Jilin Provincial Party Committee, 'Report on Comrade Kim 
Il Sung's Report',” May 09, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital 
Archive, PRC FMA 106-00767-02, 14-18. Obtained by Shen Zhihua and translated 
by Jeffrey Wang and Charles Kraus, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/116547> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
34 Lee, North Korea, p. 102. 
35 "The Economic and Political Situation of the DPRK," June 12, 1960, History 
and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF fond 0102, opis 16, papka 
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Electricity Conservation in North Korea from the 1960s to the 
Early 1990s
In 1960, the DPRK government formally asked the Soviet Union for 
technical assistance in building a large-capacity thermal power station 
and hydroelectric facilities. Due to a lack of technical expertise within 
the country, the North Korean leadership depended on Soviet specialists 
for assistance. In March 1960, the North Korean government sent “a 
request to the Soviet government to provide technical help by sending 
skilled specialists to assist in the planning and manufacture of turbine 
generators (60 Hz, 6-25,000 kilovolt-amperes), turbines, boilers, etc.”36 
Despite this dependence on Soviet aid, the year 1960 was actually a 
period of high electric output for the North Korean people due to above 
average rainfall. In August 1960, Kim Il Sung told the Soviet ambassador 
to the DPRK, “In particular, there is so much water on the Yalu [Amnok-
gang] River that a surplus of it in enormous quantities was thrown over 
the reserve sluices of the Supung Hydroelectric Station and there was 
even a danger of flooding Sinuiju. At the present time Pyongyang is 
receiving electricity without restrictions.”37 However, the DPRK’s 
dependence on rainfall in the Yalu River basin for electricity meant the 
countryside was extremely susceptible to irregular rainfall and 
subsequent blackouts. 
In addition, since the Yalu River borders China and North Korea, 
coownership of the body of water was negotiable. In 1955, the two sides 
agreed in principle to share the energy generated by the river. The 
Supung power station on the Yalu River was actually joint managed by 
36 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 30 March 1960," 
March 30, 1960, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF 
fond 0102, opis 16, delo 6, p.129-146. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg, 
<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116168> (date accessed 
May 17, 2020). 
37 "Journal of Soviet Ambassador in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 16 August 1960," 
August 16, 1960, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVPRF fond 
0102, opis 16, delo 7, p.43-71. Translated for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg, <https://
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119446> (date accessed May 17, 2020). 
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Beijing and Pyongyang. However, Kim Il Sung complained that the 
DPRK received a lower share of the power generated from Supung 
station.38 It was during China’s Cultural Revolution that relations 
between the two neighboring countries quickly soured and border river 
usage became heavily politicized. In the late 1960s, the Yalu River in 
particular became an ideological battleground between China’s zealous 
Maoist sycophants, better known as the Red Guards, and North Korea’s 
state security services. In January 1969, the Soviet embassy in the DPRK 
commented, “According to the testimony of eyewitnesses, a sort of 
propaganda duel is being waged on the Korean-Chinese border passing 
along the Yalu River: enormous portraits of the leaders, billboards with 
political content, and loudspeakers directed at the opposite bank have 
been set up on both sides of the river.”39 In the late 1960s, relations 
between the PRC and DPRK were not “as close as lips to teeth,” which 
was the traditional expression of revolutionary solidarity between the 
two neighboring Asian communist governments. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Chinese government started 
building dikes on PRC-DPRK border rivers without approaching the 
North Korean leadership first. Thus, the North Korean leadership held 
talks with the PRC government in 1970 regarding joint utilization of the 
border waters. The Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK, Nikolay 
Georgievich Sudarikov, explained to his Hungarian counterparts that 
the North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Jae-bong was 
particularly unhappy about Chinese construction on border rivers. The 
North Korean official explained, “Some of the dikes which the Chinese 
side recently built on the border rivers deprive Korea of the natural 
water output of the rivers and thus hinder the utilization of the latter, 
while the other dikes, during heavy raining, expose the Korean villages 
and areas to flooding and inundation; at the same time, both types of the 
38 Lee, North Korea, p. 102.
39 "First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in North Korea, 'Korean-Chinese Relations 
in the Second Half of 1968'," January 06, 1969, History and Public Policy Program 
Digital Archive, RGANI, fond 5, opis 61, delo 466, listy 1-14. Obtained by 
Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg, <https://digitalarchive.
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Chinese dike systems hinder shipping on the border rivers.”40 While the 
Soviet Union greatly assisted their North Korean comrades in 
constructing their energy sector, the People’s Republic of China 
oftentimes made life worse for their energy-deficient neighbors.
From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, energy problems within the 
DPRK came to a head and the North Korean government started 
nationwide energy conservation drives. In 1966, the North Korean 
magazine Chollima published an article, entitled “Electricity and Life,” 
in which the author Cho Chʻŏn-ho explained, “The easiest thing we can 
do is to conserve electricity and the best thing to do for the nation is to 
conserve electricity.” He continued, “Those who produce electricity will 
try hard to produce more power and those who consume will 
conserve.”41 In March 1969, the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Far East 
Department said, “The difficulties caused by drought in a number of 
regions of the country has also had an effect on the operation of industry. 
The shortage of water in reservoirs has led to a reduction of the 
production of electrical power, as a result of which in the first half of 
1968 production capacity in the chemical, foundry, and other energy-
intensive industries was [3]0-[6]0 % used.”42 In April 1968, Dr. Ervin 
Jávor, the Chairman of the Hungarian-Korean Commission of Technical 
and Scientific Cooperation, explained, “Although by now they have 
built a great number of hydroelectric power plants […], the DPRK is 
struggling with considerable energy problems. For the sake of 
conserving energy, workers in the production plants take their day off 
40 "Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign 
Ministry," May 05, 1970, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1970, 54. doboz, 81, 00843/7/1970. Obtained and 
translated for NKIDP by Balázs Szalontai, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.
org/document/116578> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
41 Cho Chʻŏn-ho, “Chŏnʾgi wa uri saenghwal,” Chollima (April 1966), pp. 27-29.
42 "Far East Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'The Domestic Situation and 
the Foreign Policy of the Korean People's Democratic Republic'," March 28, 
1969, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI, fond 5, opis 
61, delo 466, listy 71-81. Obtained by Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary 
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on a staggered schedule rather than on the same day of the week.”43 
Even communist allies of the North Korean socialist system noticed how 
dire the energy situation was in the country during the late 1960s. 
North Korea’s electricity shortages in the 1960s and 1970s correlated 
with an increase in Pyongyang’s public promotion of Juche. For 
example, in 1965, Kim Il Sung gave a speech in Indonesia where he 
outlined the main principles of Juche and in 1972 Juche was cemented as 
the Party’s guiding ideological force in the DPRK’s Constitution. During 
a visit to Jakarta in 1965, Kim Il Sung emphasized that “our Party 
consistently sticks to self- reliance in ideology, sovereignty in politics, 
independence in economy, and self-protection in national defense.”44 
Seven years later, Juche was enshrined in North Korea’s political culture. 
Ironically, at the same time as Kim Il Sung depended on Soviet energy 
assistance, the DPRK’s Constitution underwent a Juche-inspired 
revision in 1972. Article Four of the North Korea’s revised 1972 
Constitution stated, “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is 
guided in its activity by the Juche idea of the Workers’ Party of Korea, a 
creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our 
country.”45 Instead of reaffirming Marxism-Leninism as the ideological 
foundation of the Korean Workers’ Party, the DPRK government 
positioned Juche as a uniquely Korean approach to Marxism-Leninism. 
Behind the public Juche discourse, North Korea continued to ask 
Moscow for assistance in improving the country’s electrical grid. In 1969, 
the North Korean leadership attached “great importance to accelerating 
the construction of the Bukchang [Pukchang] thermal power station 
43 "Report on the 27 March-2 April 1968 session of the Hungarian-Korean 
Commission of Technical and Scientific Cooperation," April 16, 1968, History and 
Public Policy Program Digital Archive, MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1968, 58. doboz, 5, 
001364/3/1968. Obtained and translated for NKIDP by Balazs Szalontai, <https://
digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110629> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
44 Seong-Chang Cheong, "Stalinism and Kimilsungism: A Comparative Analysis of 
Ideology and Power," Asian Perspective, vol. 24, no. 1 (2000), p. 142.
45 Christopher Hale, “Multifunctional Juche: A Study of the Changing Dynamic 
between Juche and the State Constitution in North Korea,” Korea Journal, vol. 42, 
no. 3 (Autumn 2002), p. 296.
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being built with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union.” On 
December 2, 1969, Kim Il, a North Korean Politburo member, told the 
Soviet embassy in Pyongyang, “We need three units with a total capacity 
of 300,000 kwt to be in operation at this station by the end of 1969 and a 
fourth unit in the first quarter of 1970.” Kim Il admitted, “Even 
considering the putting of this additional capacity in operation, the 
country’s economy will nevertheless experience a shortage of a supply 
of electric power.” The North Korean official added “that everything 
possible [must] be done to accelerate the installation of equipment at the 
Bukchang thermal power station. While he said this he stressed that the 
Soviet specialists at Bukchang are working very well.”46 It was 
increasingly clear that Pyongyang promoted Juche in public-oriented 
rhetoric but when it came to actual practice, Kim Il Sung’s regime 
depended heavily on Soviet electrification aid. 
In the early 1970s, North Korea’s energy sector continued to suffer 
from its unreliable hydroelectric power plants. In a June 28, 1972 
conversation with I.T Novikov, the Deputy Chairman of the USSR 
Council of Ministers, Kim Il Sung said, “The Pyongyang TEhTs [thermal 
power plant] and the Bukchang TEhS [thermal power station], built with 
the aid of the Soviet Union, have helped during this difficult period, as a 
result of which the chronic shortage of electrical power was overcome to 
a considerable degree.” Kim continued, “However, this has nevertheless 
been insufficient.”47 This contradiction between state ideology and 
46 “From the Journal of N.G. Sudarikov, 'Record of a Conversation with Kim Il, 
Member of the KWP CC Politburo and First Deputy Chairman of the DPRK 
Cabinet of Ministers',” December 02, 1969, History and Public Policy Program 
Digital Archive, RGANI, fond 5, opis 61, delo 463, listy 267-272. Contributed by 
Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg, <https://digitalarchive.
wilsoncenter.org/document/134266> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
47 “From the Journal of Y.D. Fadeev, 'Record of Conversation between I.T. Novikov, 
Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Kim Il Sung, General 
Secretary of the KWP CC and Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet of Ministers, 28 
June 1972',” July 03, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
RGANI, f. 5, op. 64, d. 423, ll. 20-32. Contributed by Sergey Radchenko and 
translated by Gary Goldberg, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/134136> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
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action suggests that North Korea’s electrification strategy depended on 
Soviet aid, not the Juche idea.
In the 1970s, South Korea built its first nuclear power plant in Gori, a 
village on the outskirts of Busan, which exacerbated concerns in the 
DPRK that the Republic of Korea (the official title of South Korea, ROK) 
was quickly becoming the dominant economic power on the peninsula. 
Kim Il Sung admitted to Soviet officials in 1972 that North Korea was 
“experiencing those difficulties which for Soviet people are a past stage, 
that is, we are behind you.”48 The North Korean leader understood that 
his country was underdeveloped vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Despite his 
public-facing Juche rhetoric, Kim was never shy about requesting energy 
assistance from his Soviet comrades. In 1979, the Hungarian ambassador 
to the DPRK explained, “With the nuclear power plant in Gori included, 
the output of electric power generation in South Korea reached 6.59 
million kW. With the completion and activation of the sixth nuclear 
power plant, in 1986 its output will reach 20 million kW.” He continued, 
“By the end of 1986 they want to complete and operate 7 nuclear power 
plants, 5 hydroelectric power stations, 24 thermal power stations, and an 
ebb and flow power plant. 26 nuclear power plants will be built by 2000.” 
With South Korea’s nuclear development, Kim Il Sung increasingly felt 
that the DPRK would be left behind in this inter-Korean competition. 
Faced with the idea of a more prosperous and electrified ROK, the 
leadership in Pyongyang “strongly urged the socialist countries—for 
instance, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and China—to 
provide it with equipment for nuclear power plants or even to build a 
nuclear power plant.” The Hungarian ambassador then concluded, “It 
tries to make up for its lag behind South Korea in this way, with the 
hidden intention that later it may become capable of producing an 
48 “From the Journal of N.G. Sudarikov, 'Record of a Conversation with Kim Il 
Sung, General Secretary of the KWP CC and Chairman of the DPRK Cabinet 
of Ministers, 9 October 1972',” November 16, 1972, History and Public Policy 
Program Digital Archive, RGANI, f. 5, op. 64, d. 423, ll. 38-53. Contributed by 
Sergey Radchenko and translated by Gary Goldberg, <https://digitalarchive.
wilsoncenter.org/document/134145> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
126 Benjamin R. Young
atomic bomb.” While North Korea’s electricity problems were most 
likely not the primary cause for the Kim family regime’s pursuit of 
nuclear technology, it seems that it played a small role in the 
construction of the DPRK’s nuclear program. 
In the 1980s, Kim Il Sung faced a dilemma: continue his emphasis 
on hydroelectric power or foster the development of coal-powered 
thermal power stations. At the Sixth Party Congress in 1980, the North 
Korean leader stated, “Together with the construction of hydropower 
plants it is necessary to widen the construction of thermal power plants 
(TPPs)…. To start a wide construction of TPPs performing on low-calorie 
coals, as well as that of medium and small TPPs using the radiating and 
excessive heats.”49 Hydroelectric power stations were too dependent on 
rainfall while thermal power stations depended on the DPRK’s scanty 
coal reserves. As Hy-Sang Lee explains, “Behind the emergent shortage 
of coal was everything that was wrong with Juche socialism – the 
technical obsolescence, shortages of equipment and supplies, shortage of 
manpower, etc., all of which applied not just to the coal industry but to 
others as well except ordnance.”50 However, a third possibility for 
solving North Korea’s electricity scarcity problem was nuclear energy. In 
his Sixth Party Congress speech, Kim acknowledged, “In order to 
sharply increase electric energy production, it is necessary to build an 
atomic power plant and other plants using new energy resources.”51
In the early 1980s, Pyongyang asked the Communist Bloc for 
assistance in starting its nuclear energy program. For example, the DPRK 
government sent students to Czechoslovakia and East Germany to study 
nuclear physics. The Hungarian embassy in Pyongyang explained that 
the North Korean students “are concerned mainly about the subject of 
nuclear energy and they are interested in every question related to it. This 
interest is not a recent one.”52 In 1983, the leadership in Pyongyang asked 
49 Moiseyev, “The North Korean Energy Sector,” p. 53.
50 Lee, North Korea, p. 103. 
51 Moiseyev, “The North Korean Energy Sector,” p. 53. 
52 "Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign 
Ministry," April 30, 1981, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
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Hungary for technical expertise in nuclear development “since the DPRK 
will soon start building its first nuclear power plant.”53 Initially, Kim Il 
Sung explained his desire for nuclear power plants as a way to alleviate 
the DPRK’s chronic energy shortage. Kim told East German leader Erich 
Honecker in May 1984, “During my visit to the Soviet Union, I also made 
agreements with our Soviet comrades to build nuclear power plants. We 
are convinced that when we have accomplished this task, we will 
certainly be able to produce 100 billion kWh of energy. And once we have 
done this, developing agriculture is no longer a problem. Once we have 
solved the industry problem, nothing else will be an issue.”54 Was the 
construction of nuclear energy power plants in the DPRK a Trojan horse 
for the regime’s development of nuclear weapons? Perhaps, but I believe 
Kim Il Sung initially wanted to use nuclear facilities for energy 
production within the DPRK.
In February 1985, the Soviet Union entered into negotiations with 
the Kim family regime regarding the construction of the DPRK’s first 
nuclear power plant. North Korea’s Premier Kang Seongsan 
“emphasized to the deputation that the project to be built was not only 
of economic but also of political importance.” As the Hungarian 
embassy in Pyongyang commented on the North Korean mindset 
concerning nuclear energy, “On the one hand, they would like to offset 
the fact that a nuclear power plant is already in operation in South 
Korea; on the other hand, [the project] is to enhance the DPRK’s 
MOL, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1981, 86. doboz, 72, 003729/1981. Obtained and translated 
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economic prestige in foreign eyes.”55 According to a declassified 
document from the CIA, “In December 1985, the Soviets also agreed to 
help the North build its first nuclear power plant, which reportedly will 
have a capacity of about 1.4 million kilowatts…This project would be a 
boon to the North because it would allow for diversification of energy 
sources and provide relatively stable supplies.”56 Thus, Kim Il Sung’s 
pursuit of nuclear energy may have been economically-motivated rather 
than solely military-focused. 
In addition, at the same time as the DPRK government covertly 
pursued nuclear energy, Kim Il Sung publicly advocated a nuclear-free 
zone on the Korean Peninsula. During Erich Honecker’s 1986 visit to 
North Korea, Kim Il Sung told his East German counterpart that he 
favored Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s proposal of turning the Asia-
Pacific region into a “peace zone” and was also “in favor of the proposed 
halt to the nuclear arms race and averting the danger of a nuclear 
inferno.”57 Kim Il Sung particularly detested the presence of U.S. nuclear 
weapons on South Korean soil. In July 1988, the North Korean leader 
told a visiting East German military delegation, “The Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea is confronted with many nuclear weapons in 
South Korea that belong to the U.S.” Kim continued, “This is why the 
leadership of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has also already 
made numerous proposals for the withdrawal of U.S. troops and their 
nuclear weapons, for ending the arms race, and for reducing the armed 
55 "Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign 
Ministry," March 09, 1985, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, 
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forces on the Korean Peninsula in stages in order to transform it into a 
nuclear-free zone of peace.”58 The U.S. nuclear arsenal in the ROK 
greatly worried the security-conscious North Korean leader and made 
him into an unlikely champion of nuclear nonproliferation during the 
mid to late 1980s.
North Korean Electricity from the 1990s to the Present Day
The 1990s were a tumultuous period for the North Korean 
leadership. From Kim Il Sung’s death in 1994 to the nuclear crisis with 
the U.S. government, the Kim family regime faced many challenges. For 
North Korea’s energy sector, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
collapse of the Warsaw Pact meant Pyongyang was increasingly isolated 
economically and diplomatically on the global stage. With the end of 
energy subsidies and aid from the Soviet Union, the North Korean 
people encountered even more electricity shortages in the 1990s. With no 
Soviet assistance, the energy situation in the DPRK during the 1990s 
deteriorated from bad to horrendous and the country’s economy stalled 
to a halt.59 As a way to guarantee regime stability, North Korea 
eventually prioritized nuclear weapons development over all domestic 
sectors, including electricity. During the 1990s, the leadership in 
Pyongyang clung even tighter to militarism. Under Kim Jong Il’s rule, 
the nuclear program in the DPRK was to be solely dedicated to military 
needs, not electricity shortages. Kim Jong Il also shifted North Korea’s 
ideological priorities to Songun (military-first politics). Kim Il Sung’s 
balancing act of Juche rhetoric and Soviet dependency in the energy 
sector was replaced by Kim Jong Il’s sole focus on militarization.  
Known in official DPRK rhetoric as the “Arduous March,” the 1990s 
58 “Report on Visit of East German Military Delegation to North Korea,” July 19, 
1988, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BA, DY 30, 
2508. Translated by Grace Leonard, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/
document/113202> (date accessed May 17, 2020).
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were a period of great suffering and famine for most North Korean 
people. Much of this was exacerbated by the lack of electricity. 
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, “During 
North Korea’s economic downturn in the early 1990s, the country’s 
electricity consumption dropped by more than half from 33 billion 
kilowatthours (BkWh) in 1990 to 16 BkWh by 2000. The country 
experiences chronic electricity shortages and a deteriorating industrial 
sector.”60 According to data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), 
North Korea’s “per capita electricity consumption in 2008 remained just 
819kWh, substantially lower than the 919kWh recorded in 1971.”61 This 
significant drop in electricity consumption suggests that Soviet tutelage 
essentially prevented mass blackouts in North Korea. Without Soviet 
aid, Kim Jong Il’s regime was unable to prevent constant electricity 
shortages around the country. 
In addition, testimony from high-level defector Hwang Jang Yop 
suggests that Kim Jong Il personally approved electricity requests from 
the DPRK’s “power organizations,” such as the military. Hwang said, 
“All power organizations directly requested Kim Jong Il to provide 
electricity to those organizations and he approved the requests… it was 
revealed that Kim approved as many as 190 counts of electricity-
concerned requests the power organizations raised.”62 Thus, Kim Jong Il 
prioritized certain sectors, such as the military and the police, when it 
came to electricity supply. Kim Jong Il exerted personal control over the 
DPRK’s scant electricity resources. This energy strategy also pitted the 
DPRK’s power organizations against one another and further 
consolidated Kim Jong Il’s iron rule. Despite the country’s unstable 
electrical grid and Kim Jong Il’s oppressive policies, the North Korean 
60 “North Korea: Overview,” U.S Energy Information Administration, June 2018, 
<https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=PRK> (date 
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people persevered and participated in local black markets in order to 
survive. These black markets became spaces of grassroots capitalism in 
the DPRK. Chinese-made solar panels began to be sold in these North 
Korean markets.
After Kim Jong Il’s death in 2011, Kim Jong Un took power in the 
DPRK and struggled to increase his nation’s electricity supply. However, 
Kim Jong Un took a page from his grandfather’s book and enlisted the 
help of Russian energy specialists. In 2019, the DPRK and Russian 
governments “agreed to continue cooperation in the field of experience 
exchange and training specialists for the design, construction and 
operation of the 500-kilowatt energy grid.”63 In addition, there have been 
talks between Moscow and Pyongyang regarding the construction of an 
“electric energy bridge.” In January 2015, Russia’s largest-power 
generating company, RusHydro, “signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the South Korean company K-water where they 
agreed to start preparing a feasibility study for creating an energy bridge 
from Russia to the Republic of Korea through the territory of the DPRK.”64 
While no concrete results have yet been yielded from this energy bridge 
idea, it does suggest that Kim Jong Un’s electrification strategy resembles 
his grandfather’s dependency on Moscow for energy assistance. 
 Under Kim Jong Un’s reign, renewable energy and improving the 
country’s electric output has been a domestic priority. Currently, around 
55% of North Korean households are equipped with solar panels.65 In 
October 2018, DPRK state-run media featured a documentary on 
domestic renewable energy products, such as high voltage inverters. The 
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documentary narrator said, “Electricity was the biggest problem but we 
achieved such a highly advanced, cutting-edge technology ourselves 
from scratch, which was once monopolized by developed nations.”66 In 
addition, Kim Jong Un hopes to expand the state’s alternative energy 
resources by investing in “huge sea barriers with electricity-generating 
turbines to harness the power of the ocean’s tides.” The North Korean 
leader may also be interested in “transforming coal into synthetic fuels 
that can serve as substitutes for liquid petroleum fuels like gasoline and 
diesel.”67 While the state still mostly depends on hydroelectric and coal-
fired power plants, this newfound emphasis on renewable energy fits 
with global environmentalist trends.
In summation, I aimed to show that North Korea’s electricity 
shortages stemmed from an overreliance on Moscow. Despite numerous 
setbacks, the North Korean people persisted and remained resilient in the 
post-Cold War era. Using solar energy as a way to overcome the nation’s 
electricity shortages, the North Korean people are on the cutting edge of 
green energy trends and asserted their own agency in solving their energy 
scarcity. New evidence suggests that Kim Jong Un is resurrecting Kim Il 
Sung’s dependency on Moscow for electrification aid, which may lead to 
economic trade imbalances for the DPRK. As I explained in this paper, 
North Korea’s electricity issues did not result from the regime’s Juche 
ideology. The legacy of Soviet energy dependency left the North Korean 
government unprepared for the post-Cold War world. 
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